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Institutional Corruption Conference II: Definition and Diagnosis
Wednesday, February 8th, 2012
Robert Wechsler
Lawrence Lessig, who heads the Safra Center and hosted the event,
started by defining institutional corruption as:
This is a narrow definition that focuses on campaign finance and lobbying issues. At the local level, despite the fact that even most elected officials run inexpensive campaigns and do not depend on lobbyists and, therefore, do not participate in an economy of influence that is powered by contributions, or even political parties in many cases, there is still institutional corruption, that is, legal and sometimes pervasive conduct that creates an appearance of impropriety and undermines public trust.
Mistakes Made in Diagnosing Institutional Corruption
Dennis Thompson, a Harvard professor whose book Ethics in Congress I wrote about in several posts last year, spoke about diagnosing institutional corruption. He pointed out the three most commonly made mistakes that are made in doing this. One is the confusion of IC with its consequences. Consequences, such as the level of public trust in a local government, are not good indicators of IC, because there are other factors that lead to the same consequences. There can, for example, be high public trust because corruption is secret, or corruption is known, but not seen as corruption. On the other hand, the disclosure of conflicts can, in the short run, undermine public trust, even though it leads to a good ethics environment.
A second mistake that is made is to confuse personal and institutional interests, for example, bribes and campaign contributions. Institutional interests are those that are a necessary part of doing the job, and for most elected officials this includes the requirement to raise campaign funds. Bribes are only sought for personal reasons. Policies to prevent bribes are very different from policies to prevent the corruption of a legislative body through the raising of campaign funds. The latter requires finding different means of institutional support, such as public financing of elections.
The third mistake is the conclusion many reach that only the system is to blame, not the individuals involved in it. Or, in the alternative, that every politician is a crook. Instead, pressure should be placed on individual officials to make changes in the system. Not all solutions to institutional corruption need be radical as some argue based on their mistaken beliefs.
The big dilemma in reforming political institutions, according to Thompson, continuing to employ the medical metaphor he loves, is who will administer the treatment. Those who have the capacity and power to change the institution must be enlisted to improve their own health. But these same individuals are the ones with the greatest interest in preserving the status quo. Ethics reform is difficult. That's why it usually requires a big scandal to move forward more than a baby step at a time. But there are ways to do it. I have devoted a long chapter of my forthcoming book to the various approaches to ethics reform.
Robert Wechsler
Director of Research-Retired, City Ethics
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A situation where influences within an economy of influence tend to weaken the effectiveness of an institution, especially by weakening public trust of the institution.This is an academic definition. What's important to take from it is (1) the fact that institutional corruption is a situation rather than an act (and it is hard to deal with IC situations in the usual criminal-like enforcement mechanisms of a government ethics program); (2) that in institutions such as governments there is an "economy of influence," that is, running for office requires funding (campaign, party, and PAC contributions), and those who provide the funds generally get influence disproportionate from others by doing so; and (3) that even when the influence is legal, it weakens public trust, and this makes government, and its democratic processes, less effective.
This is a narrow definition that focuses on campaign finance and lobbying issues. At the local level, despite the fact that even most elected officials run inexpensive campaigns and do not depend on lobbyists and, therefore, do not participate in an economy of influence that is powered by contributions, or even political parties in many cases, there is still institutional corruption, that is, legal and sometimes pervasive conduct that creates an appearance of impropriety and undermines public trust.
Mistakes Made in Diagnosing Institutional Corruption
Dennis Thompson, a Harvard professor whose book Ethics in Congress I wrote about in several posts last year, spoke about diagnosing institutional corruption. He pointed out the three most commonly made mistakes that are made in doing this. One is the confusion of IC with its consequences. Consequences, such as the level of public trust in a local government, are not good indicators of IC, because there are other factors that lead to the same consequences. There can, for example, be high public trust because corruption is secret, or corruption is known, but not seen as corruption. On the other hand, the disclosure of conflicts can, in the short run, undermine public trust, even though it leads to a good ethics environment.
A second mistake that is made is to confuse personal and institutional interests, for example, bribes and campaign contributions. Institutional interests are those that are a necessary part of doing the job, and for most elected officials this includes the requirement to raise campaign funds. Bribes are only sought for personal reasons. Policies to prevent bribes are very different from policies to prevent the corruption of a legislative body through the raising of campaign funds. The latter requires finding different means of institutional support, such as public financing of elections.
The third mistake is the conclusion many reach that only the system is to blame, not the individuals involved in it. Or, in the alternative, that every politician is a crook. Instead, pressure should be placed on individual officials to make changes in the system. Not all solutions to institutional corruption need be radical as some argue based on their mistaken beliefs.
The big dilemma in reforming political institutions, according to Thompson, continuing to employ the medical metaphor he loves, is who will administer the treatment. Those who have the capacity and power to change the institution must be enlisted to improve their own health. But these same individuals are the ones with the greatest interest in preserving the status quo. Ethics reform is difficult. That's why it usually requires a big scandal to move forward more than a baby step at a time. But there are ways to do it. I have devoted a long chapter of my forthcoming book to the various approaches to ethics reform.
Robert Wechsler
Director of Research-Retired, City Ethics
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