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Conflict of Interest Provisions

This is the place to discuss additional conflict of interest provisions. Below are some comments added at the end of 100, but there are several more such provisions that can be found in ethics codes. What are your thoughts about and experiences with other conflict provisions? How do you think it is best to deal with city attorney conflicts when those conflicts are not dealt with clearly in their rules of professional conduct?

Additionial Comment to 100: Some codes, including the IMLA Code, make it an ethical duty to comply with laws, including criminal laws, discrimination and sexual harassment laws, and lobbying laws. The chronic violation of more minor laws and rules is also sometimes cited.

It is a difficult question whether to involve an ethics commission with every violation of law. Criminal and other undesirable activity by public servants certainly undermines the public trust in municipal government. But is the ethics process the right place to deal with such matters, or are they better dealt with by supervisors or, in the case of elected officials, by voters? The duty to comply with laws is not included here because, as long as the violation of other laws is made public, criminal and other proceedings should deal with them as well as the ethics process. However, if the violation is somehow hidden from the public, it might be appropriate for an ethics commission to make the violation public. Has anyone seen language to this effect?

I believe that cities should consider special ethical guidelines and rules for city attorneys. This is a complicated area, where it is sometimes not clear what it means to represent the city (the mayor, the council, the public interest in such things as truth, openness, ane fair process). I feel that guidelines are important not only for attorneys, who often do not recognize the special conflicts they face, but also to protect the public interest, which is harmed by city attorneys who ignore conflicts in the name of representing their client. Who their client is in each sort of instance needs to be clarified. Attorney conflicts of interest are covered by their state's disciplinary rules, but (i) these rules are enforced by lawyers rather than city residents; and (ii) these rules do not deal with the special conflicts that city attorneys are faced with. I would like to see a discussion about it, including recommended provisions to deal with the problems practitioners, both lawyers and non-lawyers, have witnessed.

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False statements are a means of unfairly manipulating a situation in one's own favor. Please share your thoughts about this problem and your experiences with attempts to solve it through an ethics code or otherwise.

100(21). Honesty in Applications for Positions

No person seeking to become an official or employee,* consultant* or contractor may make any false statement, submit any false document, or knowingly withhold information about wrongdoing in connection with employment by or service for the city.

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Many officials face a conflict every evening they have a meeting scheduled: between their obligation to attend a meeting of a board they sit on and their desire to do one of a number of different things. Many officials choose something else often enough that it has an effect on the board's effectiveness.

Please share your thoughts about this provision, and your experiences with problems involving meeting attendance and various attempts to deal with these problems.

100(20). Meeting Attendance

All members of boards and commissions are expected to attend and be prepared for meetings. It is a violation of this code to miss or come unprepared to more than a third of a board or commission's meetings in a twelve-month period.

Comment: If a member must miss or come unprepared for more than a small number of meetings, he or she should resign, whether or not his or her reasons are good ones. One can always ask to return to a position when one's health or schedule have improved.


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There is a lot of talk about courtesy in politics, but most discourtesy involves lack of respect and uncontrolled emotions on the part of officials in their relations with each other. It becomes an ethical problem when citizens are attacked in order to intimidate them and others from being involved in local politics. The conflicting interest here is central to democracy: participation in government. False personal attacks are a favorite means of decreasing participation and citizen oversight.

I've been on the receiving end myself, and it is ugly. It would not be so favored if it were clearly considered an ethical violation.

100(19). Falsely Impugning Reputation

An official or employee* may not falsely impugn the reputation of a city resident. If an official or employee* believes his or her accusation to be true, and then learns that it was false, even in part, he or she should apologize in the same forum the accusations were made. A failure to so apologize within a reasonable period of time after learning of the falseness of the accusations will create the presumption that the conduct was fully intentional.

Comment: A common way for officials to intimidate residents who speak out and to prevent others from similarly speaking out is to use their positions of respect to falsely attack people who lack such positions, and thereby destroy their reputation and the legitimacy of their arguments, so that opposition from that individual and others will lessen. This form of misuse of office is central to undermining free debate as well as citizen oversight of executive and legislative actions.

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Complicity with and knowledge of violations are two minefields it is worth crossing. They involve not only dotting the i's, but they also go right to a central element of responsibility: are you responsible for what others do, especially when you are involved or you let it happen. So much of what happens in any organization involves knowingly letting others -- especially subordinates -- do the dirty work.

Note that this provision includes outsiders, such as people doing business with the city. Why should officials and employees be the only ones responsible for how they respond to outsiders' temptations?

Please share your thoughts about the issues involved here, as well as your experiences with such provisions or with situations that might have happened or been dealt with differently if there had been such a provision.

100(18). Complicity with or Knowledge of Others' Violations

No one may, directly or indirectly, induce, encourage, or aid anyone to violate any provision of this code. If an official or employee* suspects that someone has violated this code, he or she is required to report it to the relevant individual, either the employee's supervisor, the board on which the official sits or before which the official or employee* is appearing* or will soon appear, or the Ethics Commission if the violation is past or if it is not immediately relevant to a decision, to discussion, or to actions or transactions. Anyone who reports a violation in good faith will be protected by the provisions of 112.

Comment: This subsection seems to turn all city officials and employees into stool pigeons. But, in fact, a principal reason why ethics programs are ineffective is that officials and employees feel they can get away with unethical conduct because no one will turn them in. Instead of having a culture based on ethics, their city has a culture based on loyalty. People in such a city ignore conflicts of interest, because they feel protected. There are two reasons for this: (i) no one wants to be a tattle-tale and (ii) everyone is afraid to be a tattle-tale, because doing so might threaten their jobs, lead to harassment and failure to advance, or undermine their relations with people in power.

This subsection, along with the whistle-blower protection in 112, allows the people who know most what is going on in city government - city employees - to safely foster an ethical environment by preventing action in the public interest from being against their self-interest. The inclusion of this provision makes it clear to all officials and employees that government ethics is a group activity, that unethical behavior is less an individual problem than an organizational problem.

Such a provision appears in the IMLA Model Code; the comments to the IMLA provision state, in part, "Even if a community ultimately decides not to impose any duty [to report violations], it would be better off for having debated the issue."

Whether or not anonymous reports would be accepted is another area for debate. Creating a hotline for reports of violation (anonymously or not) makes it easier for city employees and others to fulfill their duty to report violations. As long as the ethics commission can file its own complaint in such an instance, there is the protection for respondents that the ethics commission must feel satisfied, after a preliminary investigation, in the truth of the report. People's experiences with such hotlines, good and bad, would be very helpful, as would information about debates about the duty to report and about hotlines and anonymous reporting of violations.

Back to tattling, which is rarely defended in a rational way. Not tattling is something very important in childhood, where it helps maintain solidarity of children against adults. But for adults there is not a group to maintain solidarity against (hopefully not the city's residents, to whom officials have a fiduciary duty) and, therefore, this sort of unquestioning loyalty is inappropriate. The best thing to do, before reporting, is to try to prevent unethical conduct before it occurs, to directly recommend, for example, that someone recuse himself or herself or seek advice from the ethics commission. But it is important that officials and employees know that unethical conduct will not be protected by the silence of fear or misplaced loyalty.

The first sentence of this subsection, on complicity and inducement, is equally important. Under most ethics codes, a private citizen or company that induces a municipal official to violate ethics laws runs no risk of penalty. For example, hoping to keep a city's business, a bank might give a personal loan to the city treasurer at a below-market interest rate. If this loan is discovered, the official might lose his or her job as a result; however, the bank will lose nothing and, more important, knowing this, it is more likely to offer the loan. Since the goal of this code is to prevent conflicts between the official's interests and the public interest, it is important that the code also make it less likely that officials are tempted into these conflicts. Please share your experiences with provisions such as this, including instances where suits have been brought, arguing that ethics commissions have no jurisdiction over anyone other than public servants.

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Consultants are an in-between group. They're not officials or employees, nor are they people who do business with the city. They advise or sometimes act for the city, and have access to confidential information as well as special relations with city staff. Please share your thoughts about and experiences with the inclusion of consultants in an ethics program.

100(17). Consultants*

A consultant* may not represent a person or entity other than the city in any matter, transaction, action, or proceeding in which the consultant participated personally and substantially as a consultant to the city. Nor may a consultant represent a person or entity in any matter, transaction, action, or proceeding against the interest of the city.

Comment: Other rules that apply expressly to consultants* are 100(8) (Confidential Information), 100(21) (Honesty in Application for Positions), and 101(2) (Transactional Disclosure). Also see the comments to 100(11), the revolving door provision.

Many codes also include language such as: A consultant may not accept other employment that will either impair the consultant's independence of judgment with respect to the consultant's official duties for the city, or that will require or induce the consultant to disclose confidential information pursuant to subsection 8 of this section. 

The same problem appears as in the comments to 100(1) above: how does one know or prove that employment will impair someone's judgment or induce someone to disclose confidential information? It is enough that consultants are prevented from representing parties against the city or in matters the city hired them to deal with, and that they be included in the confidential information provision, 100(8).

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