Although in 2008, Orange County, Florida's Ethics and Campaign Finance Reform Task Force recommended (report attached; see below) that the county have an ethics board selected by a variety of community organizations, following the model of Miami/Dade County, and Section 2-457 of the county ordinances [1] did provide for (with liberal use of the magic word "may") an ethics advisory board to be selected by the chief judge of the local circuit, Orange County does not appear to have an ethics board.

What it does have is an ombudsman [2]. That is, the county took an inspector general approach to government ethics (and fraud and waste). Not only is that not what was contemplated by the task force, but the individual chosen to be the first ombudsman does not appear to be independent, nor have the credentials or background of an inspector general.

The ordinance creates the position of County Investigative Officer in a definition, hands the job to the county ombudsman ("or an authorized agent"; of whom?). The investigator "is to be retained by independent contract with the County" and the position's duty "is to administer and process the provisions of this article."

According to the ombudsman's webpage, "In February 2011, Chase joined Orange County Mayor Teresa Jacobs’ team and served as her Aide for Constituent Relations and Outreach. After arriving at Mayor Jacobs' office, Chase rapidly gained an understanding of the proper avenues through which to address and resolve constituent's problems. In August 2011, Mayor Jacobs named him to be Orange County's first Ombudsman."

In other words, the first ombudsman was not "retained by independent contract with the County," but was an important political aide of the mayor, whom the mayor hired.

The webpage leaves no question whether the public trust or the mayor's trust is the ombudsman's goal. The quoted sentences above are given the title "Earning the Mayor's Trust."

Ombuds and inspectors general are supposed to be independent. Here is a paragraph from the Association of Inspectors General Principles and Standards [3] for IG offices (OIGs):

The inspector general is responsible for establishing and maintaining independence so that OIG opinions, conclusions, judgments, and recommendations will be impartial and viewed by others as impartial.  The inspector general and OIG staff should consider not only whether they are independent and whether their own attitudes and beliefs permit them to be independent, but also whether there is anything about their situation which might lead others to question their independence. All situations deserve consideration since it is important that the OIG be as independent as possible and impartial in fact and in appearance.

How can a former mayoral aide be seen as independent, not to mention impartial? What happens when a complaint is filed against, or the ombudsman learns information regarding, the mayor, a colleague of the mayor, an appointee of the mayor, or an opponent of the mayor?

And what county employee or vendor is going to confide in or seek advice from someone seen as close to the mayor? Independence of those providing ethics advice and investigating and enforcing ethics laws is crucial to having an ethics environment where people feel comfortable seeking advice, making tips, and filing formal complaints.

In addition, according to an article in yesterday's Orlando Sentinel [4], the ombudsman recently took a leave of absence to run for council in the largest city in the county, Orlando. He is back, because he lost. But how could he be expected not to have entered into special relationships with county officials and contractors, with the usual sort of obligations? How can he be expected to be seen as unbiased when any of these officials, or their opponents, or even his own opponents or their supporters, come before him in a matter?

It is not a good idea to have an active politician on an ethics commission. It is an even worse idea to have an active politician acting as ombudsman or inspector general.

It gets worse. According to the article, a county commissioner said that the ombudsman's political campaign "despoils the title of the position. It needs to be someone who is way, way above any suspicion."

But the ombudsman and the mayor "say his recent short stint as a candidate will not affect his job to field and re-direct complaints about county employees, contractors or vendors to the proper investigative authorities."

The ombudsman is quoted as saying in an e-mail to the reporter, "I am a professional and would never treat anyone differently in my professional role or otherwise in Mayor Jacobs' office simply because they may have treated me one way or another while I was on my personal time and on leave."

This shows a serious lack of understanding of government ethics' emphasis on relationships, obligations, and appearances, rather than the integrity of the individual official. Someone who writes something like this should not be involved in government ethics.

Finally, the mayor said, "If I have the remotest inkling that he is in any way being partial to anybody, either because of his campaign, because of my campaign or any other reason, he will be out of this office tomorrow." She too clearly does not understand (1) that one does not wait until an ombudsman has been partial (assuming one would even know about it) and (2) that the mayor is the last person on earth who should be making this determination, since the principal partiality one would expect of the ombudsman would be toward her and those with whom she has special relationships.

Robert Wechsler
Director of Research, City Ethics

203-859-1959