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There is a front-page article in the New York Times today about the recent increase in lobbying and entertaining state attorneys general (AGs), as well as in campaign contributions from businesses who have a financial interest in decisions that these AGs make, especially with respect to suits they file on behalf of consumers.

Since many state lobbying laws only requiring disclosure of lobbying directed to legislators, much of this lobbying is done in secret and the campaign contributions are permitted. Many contributions are made through partisan AG associations, which were formed in 2000 and 2002, and are funded by big companies that stand to benefit from AG decisions.

In addition, revolving door laws sometimes do not apply to AGs — or former AGs insist they are acting as lawyers and are, therefore, excepted from revolving door laws that apply only to lobbyists — enabling them to immediately do work for companies that are seeking special benefits from the office they just left, as well as their former "clients" in government agencies and the legislature.

The question is, are city and county attorneys being lobbied in the same way by interested parties? These attorneys — most of whom are not elected, but rather are appointed by mayors, councils, and/or managers — not only are responsible for government litigation, but are also highly influential with respect to legislation (which they usually draft) and every other local government matter, upon which they offer their legal and often policy opinions. Especially when there is no strong mayor, the city or county attorney is often the single most influential individual, even if she never gets to vote on legislation.

The last time I discussed contingency fee arrangements in local government contracting was 2007 (the focus then was on attorneys). A front-page story in today's New York Times shows clearly that I have not been giving this topic the attention it deserves.

Allegations have been made by the U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of New York (disclosure: I worked for this office as a law school intern back in 1977-78) that a New York City department and an IT contractor were engaged in defrauding Medicaid over a five-year period, at a cost of tens of millions of dollars. With respect to government ethics, the central paragraph of the article is as follows:
Does the "broken windows" theory, as first stated in a 1982 Atlantic essay by George L. Kelling and James Q. Wilson, apply to government ethics? The theory says that, if small things like broken windows are ignored, people will think that no one cares and, therefore, they will break more windows and move on to more serious misconduct. It's about setting norms and sending signals.

Forget the misuse of this theory in policing, where individuals are arrested for small offenses, sending them into the criminal justice system when they should not be. The focus of the theory was on fixing windows, showing that people do care, and sending the message that good conduct is the community norm.

Isn't this what a good local government ethics program is supposed to do:  try to prevent and fix the small instances of ethical misconduct through training, advice, and disclosure, so that the big ones don't happen? A good ethics officer should dispose of reports and complaints of minor misconduct and misconduct that isn't covered by the ethics code by talking with the official and trying to get her to understand why what she is alleged to have done (whether or not she actually did it, whether or not there is an enforceable rule involved) might be harmful to the government organization and the community if it were to become (or remain) common.

Gretchen Morgenson's investigative piece in yesterday's New York Times is extremely disturbing. According to her research, local and state government pension funds have taken huge risks, and then allowed them to be hidden from the public, by signing agreements with private equity firms that make their terms confidential, including (1) their high fees and questionable clawback provisions, (2) their provisions for investors to be charged for litigation losses or settlements by the equity firm, and sometimes (3) provisions allowing equity firm general partners to not have a fiduciary duty to the pension funds.

According to an editorial in the Orange County (CA) Register this week, Orange County citizens will soon vote on an initiative that would make their county the second one to turn its campaign finance program over to the state's Fair Political Practices Commission (FPPC). But the initiative's wording calls the FPPC "the ethics commission," which causes confusion, because many in the county, including a recent grand jury (see my blog post on this) as well as past grand juries, have called for a local ethics commission to be formed.

The editorial points out that the initiative's language is misleading, because ethics commissions — and there are many good ones in California — do far more than enforce campaign finance laws.

In the last few years, one of the biggest topics in the general area of government ethics, including campaign finance, lobbying, and transparency, has been the effect of huge campaign contributions by corporations and billionaires, which has become increasingly doable pursuant to a series of U.S. Supreme Court decisions.

These decisions do not appear to have had as much effect at the local level as at the national and state levels. I did do one blog post a year ago on how local spending by an organization funded primarily by a couple of billionaires backfired. The same post also discusses the old-fashioned problem:  local union and business association expenditures.

According to an article that appeared this weekend in the Contra Costa (CA) Times, the oil company Chevron has given nearly $3 million to three "independent" committees that have supported Richmond candidates sympathetic to its local refinery (the city's largest employer) and opposed candidates critical of it, who had filed a suit against Chevron in 2013, related to safety issues. Although presented as coalitions "of labor unions, small businesses, public safety and firefighters associations," the committees have received only a few thousand dollars from the two associations.

Is this sort of massive campaign expenditure ostensibly to protect a financial investment corrupting? If so, in what way?

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