The Revolving Door: Descent or Ascent?

The U.S. is not the only country with a revolving-door problem. In Japan, the problem is deeply institutionalized. It is as much a part of the retirement system as pensions.

But the Japanese name for the revolving door shows that not only does the system work in a different manner than ours, but that the Japanese have a different opinion of the relative value of government and business. The name is amakudari, which means "descent from heaven," the way Shinto gods used to come down to visit earth. Government is heaven, business earth. But not just anyone in government is considered a god (metaphorically speaking), only top-level bureaucrats.

According to the Wikipedia page on amakudari, it isn't quite as simple as the name implies. There are separate names for various forms of amakudari. A move to a government corporation is known as yokosuberi, or "sideslip"; successive public and private sector appointments are known as wataridori, or "migratory bird"; and a move into elected office is known as seikai tensin (I can't find a translation of this term).

There are two things that characterize the Japanese revolving door. One is that it opens up high positions for younger bureaucrats, which is rarely a factor in the American revolving door. Second, as the name implies, it is generally considered a step down, even if the work is less and the pay better. In the U.S., on the other hand, it is often considered a step up, a reward for loyalty or for pushing certain interests.

The revolving door is not as institutionalized here as it is in Japan, but in many local governments it is more institutionalized than people realize. Unlike in Japan, one's own agency does not arrange for the post-employment position (this is changing even there). But the promise or expectation of a good post-employment position can be as big a draw as a good pension (and often both are available).

Take one town I know a lot about, for example. Two first selectmen (effectively the mayor) in a row ended up in good positions after their retirement, one as head of the local chamber of commerce, the other in a state agency. This elected position also earns its holders a pension after only eight years.

Are such expectations (in addition to a $100,000 salary) necessary to attract good administrators? Considering that the next two first selectmen, one from the other party, ran for the position without any interest in post-employment jobs, I would say, No.

But such expectations may be necessary to attract people who will not rock the boat, who will not make an issue of unbid contracts, budget manipulation, the appointment of unqualified insiders, and the like.

This is a side of the revolving door that is often ignored. It's not as often an issue for elected officials, but it can be a way to ensure that department heads and the like remain team players, not only in office, but after they leave office, especially if they work for a company or organization that does business with or, like the chamber of commerce, has an interest in the policies of the local government.

Amakudari has been a big reason why Japan has been so slow at dealing with its big problems, such as its banking system. And in U.S. local governments, the future expectations of current officials, and the relationships between business and government formed by the revolving door, can also be a reason why local governments do not deal with their problems, especially their government ethics problems.

Robert Wechsler
Director of Research-Retired, City Ethics

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