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Spring Reading: Alan Rosenthal on Lobbying II
Thursday, May 15th, 2014
Robert Wechsler
This is the second post on Alan Rosenthal's The Third
House: Lobbyists and Lobbying in the States (CQ Press,
1993). This post focuses on the importance of connections over influence, the
role of money and constituents in local lobbying, and local
lobbyists as relatively unprofessional, and what that means for lobbying regulation.
Professionalization
Because there are fewer professional lobbyists at the local level, the contract lobbyists who are successful locally sometimes become power brokers. These individuals can best represent their clients by being in a position to pull a lot of strings. They can get into this position through their involvement in the majority political party, through the services they provide to officials, through their involvement in and financial support (directly and through clients) of political campaigns, and through the personal relationships they form.
Rosenthal notes that the professionalization of lobbying has made full-time lobbyists more open to regulation, because they want to be seen as professional. They also know that it is better for them to have clear lines drawn so that they don't find themselves embroiled in scandals. In addition, limitations on giving save them money.
Local lobbyists are less likely to be full-time or have a professional identity. Therefore, they are less likely to support lobbying regulations than their state and federal equivalents. This is clearly one reason why there are so few local lobbying codes, and why those that exist do not appear to have been very professionally drafted (that is, their drafters do not seem to have looked at the better local lobbying codes).
Influence, Access, and Connections
Rosenthal notes that friendship is more important in lobbying than people realize. The press focuses on money and entertaining, but as Rosenthal says, "legislators, like the rest of us, are more apt to do things for individuals they like and trust. ... Legislators and lobbyists naturally gravitate toward one another. Because they share a stake in the legislative system, they can commiserate and celebrate with each other." Rosenthal recognizes that it's no one thing that makes a difference, but rather "a whole string of contacts that forges the link."
The press tends to focus on influence as the lobbyist's primary goal, but Rosenthal recognizes that the primary goal is access. But he considers "access" too vague a word. He prefers the term "connection," because it is personal relationships that enable lobbyists to get preferential treatment for the benefits their clients are seeking. Anyone get access, but it is these connections that provide access at critical times and in especially important ways, such as being involved in negotiations, getting amendments passed or killed, and convincing leadership to let a matter die. It is also relationships that make lobbyists privy to non-public information, or public information before it becomes public, which can make all the difference in the success of their clients' goals.
You can have all the access in the world, but more important is that warning call from a council member that lets you know you have to show up at a council committee meeting, or else. Connections also mean that friendly council members will introduce and recommend you to their colleagues with whom you do not yet have a connection.
This is especially true when lobbyists are former legislators, because the "bonding that takes place in the legislature has no substitute: the experiences shared, the favors exchanged, and the debts incurred are without parallel." This is as true locally as at the state level.
As Rosenthal says, "To have a good relationship with legislators confers power on a lobbyist. For one to be close to power is tantamount to possessing it."
What Money Buys
Lobbying is not a quid pro quo endeavor. It is about ongoing relationships. Following the money is not enough. Nor does it matter much if money is given to influence officials or to satisfy their pay-to-play requirements. Money is just one part of building and maintaining relationships that, over time, provide a great variety of benefits. This is why it is so important to require lobbyists to disclose all contacts and to limit the range of activities that skew local government officials away from the benefiting their community toward benefiting those with whom they have formed special relationships. Recognizing this is necessary to recognizing lobbying regulation as a central element of a local government ethics program.
Rosenthal cites a study that looked at the effect of money not on votes (where money appears not to matter very much), but rather on committee participation. It found that "money mainly bought the marginal time, energy, and legislative resources that committee participation required." Not votes, but participation. After all, without participation by sympathetic legislators, matters cannot get out of committee.
Rosenthal gives two examples of nonprofits successful in getting grants, one due to a great deal of lobbying, the other due to a conflict of interest. Over four years, the Greater Miami Opera spent $200,000 on lobbyists and received $2 million in state grants. This is a large return on investment. A new museum called the Discovery Center did not spend a penny on lobbying and yet got a $427,000 grant, most likely because the state House speaker was a board member. The moral of the story is that there's no better lobbyist to have on staff than a high-level official (which is why high-level officials should not sit on boards of organizations seeking special benefits from their government).
Constituents
The focus on inside lobbying — lobbying directly to officials — ignores the most important connection an elected official has: with constituents. That is why outside lobbying is such an important complement to inside lobbying. It shows officials that their constituents are concerned with an issue, in the form of communications, petitions, demonstrations, op-ed pieces and letters to the editor, etc.
Numbers of constituents aren't all that matters. Rosenthal talks about "key contacts," that is, constituents who have not only special interests in a matter (an association member or a company employee), but also a special relationship with a particular official (family member, customer, neighbor, former colleague, or professional (e.g., the official's doctor or personal trainer)). One personally known constituent is worth a hundred strangers.
Rosenthal gives an example of an issue where outside lobbying is impossible, despite the fact that every association member is politically active. The issue is blocking a state ethics code for local officials. The problem is that local officials cannot be seen publicly to be opposing such a code. So they are forced to work behind the scenes. This is why, in a time of scandal, when state legislators feel forced to do something, there is no public opposition to ethics reform (or the public opposition is so absurd that it is mocked by newspaper editorials and good government organizations).
The Dilemma of Perception
One of the most entertaining parts of this book is the dilemma that Rosenthal discusses in the final chapter, "Power and Representation." Noting that "in the world of lobbying, perception is reality," Rosenthal says that the press tends to portray lobbyists as having too much influence and wielding too much power. Everyone likes to read about a lobbyist who's calling the shots behind the scenes. Lobbyists know they rarely get to call the shots. However, since that's what they're paid to do, they can't very well object to being portrayed as more successful than they really are. They're stuck with the perception they want their clients to believe, even if it happens to be a perception that turns the public against them. A team coach might be able to pooh-pooh the press giving him credit for winning a championship, but a lobbyist can't give all the credit to the council.
The Wisdom of Lobbyists
Here are a few good quotes to close with:
From a New Jersey association lobbyist: "You can't name a lobbyist who has won with money. All I want money to do is keep me even."
From a Florida lobbyist, where the legislature was in session for two months: "We're geishas for two months."
From a lobbyist: "You should never kill a bill so bad that [the opposition] can't come back next year, or you'll be out of business."
From a Minnesota association lobbyist: "It's harder to vote against someone you know than someone you don't know."
From Rosenthal: "a campaign contribution from those who are expected to give is regarded simply as table stakes, ... an ante for getting dealt a hand in the game."
A Florida contract lobbyist: "Everything must be seen in terms of relationships."
Robert Wechsler
Director of Research-Retired, City Ethics
---
Professionalization
Because there are fewer professional lobbyists at the local level, the contract lobbyists who are successful locally sometimes become power brokers. These individuals can best represent their clients by being in a position to pull a lot of strings. They can get into this position through their involvement in the majority political party, through the services they provide to officials, through their involvement in and financial support (directly and through clients) of political campaigns, and through the personal relationships they form.
Rosenthal notes that the professionalization of lobbying has made full-time lobbyists more open to regulation, because they want to be seen as professional. They also know that it is better for them to have clear lines drawn so that they don't find themselves embroiled in scandals. In addition, limitations on giving save them money.
Local lobbyists are less likely to be full-time or have a professional identity. Therefore, they are less likely to support lobbying regulations than their state and federal equivalents. This is clearly one reason why there are so few local lobbying codes, and why those that exist do not appear to have been very professionally drafted (that is, their drafters do not seem to have looked at the better local lobbying codes).
Influence, Access, and Connections
Rosenthal notes that friendship is more important in lobbying than people realize. The press focuses on money and entertaining, but as Rosenthal says, "legislators, like the rest of us, are more apt to do things for individuals they like and trust. ... Legislators and lobbyists naturally gravitate toward one another. Because they share a stake in the legislative system, they can commiserate and celebrate with each other." Rosenthal recognizes that it's no one thing that makes a difference, but rather "a whole string of contacts that forges the link."
The press tends to focus on influence as the lobbyist's primary goal, but Rosenthal recognizes that the primary goal is access. But he considers "access" too vague a word. He prefers the term "connection," because it is personal relationships that enable lobbyists to get preferential treatment for the benefits their clients are seeking. Anyone get access, but it is these connections that provide access at critical times and in especially important ways, such as being involved in negotiations, getting amendments passed or killed, and convincing leadership to let a matter die. It is also relationships that make lobbyists privy to non-public information, or public information before it becomes public, which can make all the difference in the success of their clients' goals.
You can have all the access in the world, but more important is that warning call from a council member that lets you know you have to show up at a council committee meeting, or else. Connections also mean that friendly council members will introduce and recommend you to their colleagues with whom you do not yet have a connection.
This is especially true when lobbyists are former legislators, because the "bonding that takes place in the legislature has no substitute: the experiences shared, the favors exchanged, and the debts incurred are without parallel." This is as true locally as at the state level.
As Rosenthal says, "To have a good relationship with legislators confers power on a lobbyist. For one to be close to power is tantamount to possessing it."
What Money Buys
Lobbying is not a quid pro quo endeavor. It is about ongoing relationships. Following the money is not enough. Nor does it matter much if money is given to influence officials or to satisfy their pay-to-play requirements. Money is just one part of building and maintaining relationships that, over time, provide a great variety of benefits. This is why it is so important to require lobbyists to disclose all contacts and to limit the range of activities that skew local government officials away from the benefiting their community toward benefiting those with whom they have formed special relationships. Recognizing this is necessary to recognizing lobbying regulation as a central element of a local government ethics program.
Rosenthal cites a study that looked at the effect of money not on votes (where money appears not to matter very much), but rather on committee participation. It found that "money mainly bought the marginal time, energy, and legislative resources that committee participation required." Not votes, but participation. After all, without participation by sympathetic legislators, matters cannot get out of committee.
Rosenthal gives two examples of nonprofits successful in getting grants, one due to a great deal of lobbying, the other due to a conflict of interest. Over four years, the Greater Miami Opera spent $200,000 on lobbyists and received $2 million in state grants. This is a large return on investment. A new museum called the Discovery Center did not spend a penny on lobbying and yet got a $427,000 grant, most likely because the state House speaker was a board member. The moral of the story is that there's no better lobbyist to have on staff than a high-level official (which is why high-level officials should not sit on boards of organizations seeking special benefits from their government).
Constituents
The focus on inside lobbying — lobbying directly to officials — ignores the most important connection an elected official has: with constituents. That is why outside lobbying is such an important complement to inside lobbying. It shows officials that their constituents are concerned with an issue, in the form of communications, petitions, demonstrations, op-ed pieces and letters to the editor, etc.
Numbers of constituents aren't all that matters. Rosenthal talks about "key contacts," that is, constituents who have not only special interests in a matter (an association member or a company employee), but also a special relationship with a particular official (family member, customer, neighbor, former colleague, or professional (e.g., the official's doctor or personal trainer)). One personally known constituent is worth a hundred strangers.
Rosenthal gives an example of an issue where outside lobbying is impossible, despite the fact that every association member is politically active. The issue is blocking a state ethics code for local officials. The problem is that local officials cannot be seen publicly to be opposing such a code. So they are forced to work behind the scenes. This is why, in a time of scandal, when state legislators feel forced to do something, there is no public opposition to ethics reform (or the public opposition is so absurd that it is mocked by newspaper editorials and good government organizations).
The Dilemma of Perception
One of the most entertaining parts of this book is the dilemma that Rosenthal discusses in the final chapter, "Power and Representation." Noting that "in the world of lobbying, perception is reality," Rosenthal says that the press tends to portray lobbyists as having too much influence and wielding too much power. Everyone likes to read about a lobbyist who's calling the shots behind the scenes. Lobbyists know they rarely get to call the shots. However, since that's what they're paid to do, they can't very well object to being portrayed as more successful than they really are. They're stuck with the perception they want their clients to believe, even if it happens to be a perception that turns the public against them. A team coach might be able to pooh-pooh the press giving him credit for winning a championship, but a lobbyist can't give all the credit to the council.
The Wisdom of Lobbyists
Here are a few good quotes to close with:
From a New Jersey association lobbyist: "You can't name a lobbyist who has won with money. All I want money to do is keep me even."
From a Florida lobbyist, where the legislature was in session for two months: "We're geishas for two months."
From a lobbyist: "You should never kill a bill so bad that [the opposition] can't come back next year, or you'll be out of business."
From a Minnesota association lobbyist: "It's harder to vote against someone you know than someone you don't know."
From Rosenthal: "a campaign contribution from those who are expected to give is regarded simply as table stakes, ... an ante for getting dealt a hand in the game."
A Florida contract lobbyist: "Everything must be seen in terms of relationships."
Robert Wechsler
Director of Research-Retired, City Ethics
---
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