making local government more ethical
I've written several posts about individuals who have created fiefdoms (a D.A., a housing authority director, a city pension board attorney, the director of a council of local governments, and the CEO of a state university foundation), but none of them were union leaders. A large investigative piece in the New York Times today provides an excellent description of the fiefdom of the head of New York City's correction officers union.

Uniformed unions wield a disproportionate power in most local governments. One reason is that their support is often considered necessary to win an election. This gives them a great deal of leverage with elected officials. For one thing, mayors and local legislators rarely criticize the unions in public. For example, when in November, the mayor called for "a culture change" in the city's violent jail, he criticized the corrections department, not the union. In fact, in October, the mayor publicly praised the union president.

The Times investigation shows how many other ways the union president wields his power. The principal way is through intimidation. He allegedly walked into the office of the department's lead investigator and threatened her. And then she was replaced . . . with a childhood friend of the union president, whose brother had been on the union's executive board. A culture of violence against prisoners can derive from a culture of fear and cronyism in a fiefdom.

According to an article yesterday on the Baltimore Brew website, a year ago Baltimore's mayor officiated at a wedding between two individuals who lobby the city government. In Las Vegas, no less.

Mayors, judges and, sometimes, other local government officials often officiate at weddings. Some ethics codes have a special exception from the gift ban that allows for this, but most make no mention of it.

The question is, should there be limits on officiating at weddings, or should government officials be allowed to use their public office to officiate at anyone's wedding, including those of lobbyists, contractors, developer, and grantees ("restricted sources")?

Partial withdrawal from participation is not a sufficient cure for an apparent conflict of interest. When there is any involvement, it can be seen as providing preferential treatment, as being unfair. Once again this is made clear, in the most controversial local government problem of the year:  a white police officer's killing of a black man in Ferguson, MO.

According to an article in Newsweek, the elected St. Louis County prosecutor, Robert McCulloch, is seen as especially sympathetic to the police. "His father was a St. Louis policeman killed in the line of duty by a black man when McCulloch was 12. His brother, nephew and cousin all served with the St. Louis police. His mother worked as a clerk for the force for 20 years. McCulloch would have joined the force too, but he lost a leg in high school due to cancer. 'I couldn’t become a policeman, so being county prosecutor is the next best thing,' he once said." He also spoke out (almost alone) in favor of a continuing role for the local police in the demonstrations that followed the killing.

An article today in the New York Times describes a situation that sheds light on pay to play. It involves the Westchester County (NY) county executive, who is getting special scrutiny because he is running for governor and has, throughout his career, as well as in this election, been openly critical of pay to play. He is being accused of hypocrisy, but it may just be that he does not really understand what pay to play is, why it is problematic, or how to prevent it.

According to critics, donors who have given the Westchester county executive $900,000 in campaign contributions over the last four years have received $709 million worth of county work. The executive's campaign "scoffed at any causality, noting that contracts must be competitively bid and approved by legislators."

In an article in the New York Times this Monday, the Robeson County (NC) district attorney described his predecessor's bullying ways, which are typical of those of an individual who heads a local fiefdom:
“He is a bully, and that’s the way he ran this office. People were afraid of him. Lawyers were afraid of him. They were intimidated by his tactics."
Chicago's Legislative IG
The battle continues in Chicago over government ethics authority and funding. According to the cover letter to the legislative inspector general's semi-annual report dated August 22, 2014 (attached; see below), the IG's office has expended its 2014 budget and the city council is not willing to provide it with more funds. The council has also transferred campaign finance authority from the IG's office back to the ethics board, over the opposition of both the IG and the ethics board itself, which also lacks the resources to deal with the huge demands of campaign finance oversight, and believes that it is better to separate investigation from enforcement.

As the IG states in the letter, "Since the campaign finance reporting mechanism in itself is essentially based on an honor system which requires self-reporting, it is imperative that there are proactive reviews taking place on a consistent basis to ensure compliance." According to the IG, last year the ethics board was changed from an investigative body to an an adjudicative body, with the IG offices (there is also an executive IG) to take over its investigative responsibilities.

The IG powerfully describes the council's attitude toward ethics enforcement (council members are called "aldermen"):
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