The paths of justice have some odd twists to them. Consider these
twists. As I wrote in
a
blog post almost exactly a year ago, both parties to a case
involving a Baltimore council member's alleged acceptance of a bribe
argued that a statutory provision entitled "Action for defamation
against local government
official" was not relevant to the case. Here is the text of that
provision (§5-501):
A civil or criminal
action may not be brought against a city or town councilman, county
commissioner, county councilman, or similar official by whatever name
known, for words spoken at a meeting of the council or board of
commissioners or at a meeting of a committee or subcommittee thereof.
Without the title, this would appear, at first glance, to be an application of
legislative immunity to local legislators. But the title and the
language both make it clear it's only about actions for defamation. By
"language," I refer to the fact that it says that actions may not be
brought "for words spoken," not that a local legislator's "speech or
debate" (the constitutional language applicable to state legislators)
which is far broader, cannot be brought into evidence in actions
against local legislators.
Despite the parties' agreement that this statutory provision was not
relevant to the case, the court of special appeals applied it and found
it effectively an application of the state's legislative immunity
protection given to state legislators. That is, the court extended this
limited statute not only beyond defamation, but also beyond "words
spoken," to include all legislative activity.