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Seattle Rejects Public Financing and Embraces District Council Elections
Tuesday, November 12th, 2013
Robert Wechsler
In my estimation, Seattle voters made a big mistake last week. They
voted for two related changes to their government. One was a public
campaign financing program for citywide council elections. The other
was a change from citywide council elections to district council
elections, which would leave only two citywide positions.
Public financing was rejected 51.6% vs. 48.4%. Council districts were accepted 65.6% vs. 34.4%. Both votes will lead to more institutional corruption in Seattle. By this, I mean the legal influence of those seeking benefits from the officials to whom they contribute and the facilitation of legal pay to play.
Arguments For Public Financing
Public financing would have (1) greatly increased the value of small contributions from city residents, giving them much more clout relative to restricted sources (including contractors, developers, grantees, and lobbyists); (2) allowed more people to run, especially those without connections; and (3) required less fundraising by candidates.
District Election of Council Members
On the other hand, district election of council members — an unusual move in a city that is becoming less rather than more diverse — gives council members more influence in their neighborhoods, especially the influence to approve or reject projects and, therefore, a greater ability to institute pay to play through requiring large contributions from those involved in these projects. District election of council members often leads to what is known as "district courtesy," the "right" of council members to determine what occurs in their districts without too much interference from their colleagues. This is likely to cost Seattle taxpayers far more than the public financing program would have.
Arguments Against Public Financing (And How to Respond)
Opponents of public financing made the usual arguments against it, including:
(1) The city needs the money for public services. (Public services are made more expensive when elected officials use their offices to help their contributors. The elimination of one no-bid contract to a large contributor per election cycle can pay for a public financing program. And trust in elected officials is priceless.)
(2) Candidates may misuse public funds. (Government ethics is all about preventing the misuse of office and of public funds; public financing programs closely watch candidates' spending.)
(3) Public financing is an Incumbent Protection Act, a way for incumbents to get public money to stay in office. (Incumbency is advantageous in all situations. Public financing cannot "level the playing field" (in fact, the Supreme Court has rejected this as a goal of public financing), but it does bring more voices to the public's attention and makes it more likely that the views and candidates of opposition and small parties, and independent candidates, will become known and that the candidates will have a better chance of being elected.)
(4) There are better ways to prevent institutional corruption, especially term limits. (Term limits serve a different purpose than public financing, and they are generally not considered effective by good government experts. They do mean that career elected officials will spend their time in office preparing for the next office, rather than representing their immediate constituents.)
(5) Public financing does not get money out of politics. (This is not what matching funds public financing seeks. It seeks to make ordinary contributions worth more, so that candidates can depend on them and run a clean campaign, without taking large contributions from restricted sources.)
(6) Public financing leads to an explosion of independent spending. (Independent spending is harmful to public financing programs, but it is not limited to the few cities that have such programs.)
It's not surprising that the lead opponent of public financing, who wrote the op-ed in the Seattle Times against the proposal, is an industry lobbyist (who was, in the past, a Seattle government official).
Robert Wechsler
Director of Research-Retired, City Ethics
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Public financing was rejected 51.6% vs. 48.4%. Council districts were accepted 65.6% vs. 34.4%. Both votes will lead to more institutional corruption in Seattle. By this, I mean the legal influence of those seeking benefits from the officials to whom they contribute and the facilitation of legal pay to play.
Arguments For Public Financing
Public financing would have (1) greatly increased the value of small contributions from city residents, giving them much more clout relative to restricted sources (including contractors, developers, grantees, and lobbyists); (2) allowed more people to run, especially those without connections; and (3) required less fundraising by candidates.
District Election of Council Members
On the other hand, district election of council members — an unusual move in a city that is becoming less rather than more diverse — gives council members more influence in their neighborhoods, especially the influence to approve or reject projects and, therefore, a greater ability to institute pay to play through requiring large contributions from those involved in these projects. District election of council members often leads to what is known as "district courtesy," the "right" of council members to determine what occurs in their districts without too much interference from their colleagues. This is likely to cost Seattle taxpayers far more than the public financing program would have.
Arguments Against Public Financing (And How to Respond)
Opponents of public financing made the usual arguments against it, including:
(1) The city needs the money for public services. (Public services are made more expensive when elected officials use their offices to help their contributors. The elimination of one no-bid contract to a large contributor per election cycle can pay for a public financing program. And trust in elected officials is priceless.)
(2) Candidates may misuse public funds. (Government ethics is all about preventing the misuse of office and of public funds; public financing programs closely watch candidates' spending.)
(3) Public financing is an Incumbent Protection Act, a way for incumbents to get public money to stay in office. (Incumbency is advantageous in all situations. Public financing cannot "level the playing field" (in fact, the Supreme Court has rejected this as a goal of public financing), but it does bring more voices to the public's attention and makes it more likely that the views and candidates of opposition and small parties, and independent candidates, will become known and that the candidates will have a better chance of being elected.)
(4) There are better ways to prevent institutional corruption, especially term limits. (Term limits serve a different purpose than public financing, and they are generally not considered effective by good government experts. They do mean that career elected officials will spend their time in office preparing for the next office, rather than representing their immediate constituents.)
(5) Public financing does not get money out of politics. (This is not what matching funds public financing seeks. It seeks to make ordinary contributions worth more, so that candidates can depend on them and run a clean campaign, without taking large contributions from restricted sources.)
(6) Public financing leads to an explosion of independent spending. (Independent spending is harmful to public financing programs, but it is not limited to the few cities that have such programs.)
It's not surprising that the lead opponent of public financing, who wrote the op-ed in the Seattle Times against the proposal, is an industry lobbyist (who was, in the past, a Seattle government official).
Robert Wechsler
Director of Research-Retired, City Ethics
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