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Three Personal Myths That Hamper Our Ethical Decision-Making, and a Fool-ish Solution
Wednesday, April 30th, 2014
Robert Wechsler
Laura Hartman and Crina Archer's essay "False
Beliefs, Partial Truths: Personal Myths and Ethical Blind Spots"
(January 2012) provides a valuable new view on how our blind
spots hamper our handling of ethical matters.
Double Blindness
Their first valuable observation is that, "[i]f left uninterrogated or concealed, ethical blind spots operate as perceptual distortions, encouraging us to believe that we have a full view of our situation when, in fact, our perception ... is partial and incomplete." Thus, "ethical blind spots make us doubly blind; we not only fail to perceive the ethical dimension of problems and situations, but we remain unaware of this failure."
It's as if we walked across intersections without realizing we were colorblind and, therefore, failing to note the position of the lights (my image, not the authors'). Most of the time, we will make it across the street unharmed, but (1) we will cause harm to cars and bicycles that have to slam on their breaks or veer around us, and (2) we will eventually be hurt. Only colorblind individuals who acknowledge that they do not have a complete view of their situation and, therefore, note the position of the lights will not do harm to others or themselves. Otherwise, they are doubly blind, and dangerous.
Personal Myths
The authors focus on three blind spots that they refer to as "personal myths." These are myths not in terms of being lies, but more in terms of classical myths: they provide valuable, but inaccurate explanations. They make sense of very real experiences, even express important truths and provide personal support (e.g., a sense of self-esteem and self-empowerment), but they prevent us from seeing other important truths. The biggest problem is that these mythical explanations lead individuals away from ethical decision-making. In effect, they make us ostriches with our heads in the sand, while at the same time justifying what we do, so that not dealing with ethical matters is not our conscious choice.
This can actually be seen in terms of brain activity. When people are asked to make a choice among possibilities, but are influenced by the decisions of those around them and, therefore, choose the wrong answer, the area of their brain associated with conscious decision-making is inactive, while the area associated with perception is activated. "When we conform to the views of others, evidently we are quite literally ceding our decision-making capacity to others; in effect, we are not deciding at all."
The Myth of Moral Self-Image
The first myth the authors discuss is one that is far too rarely recognized: that we all think we are more ethical than we are. We accomplish this feat by blinding ourselves to evidence to the contrary. This makes us ethically ignorant, at least when it comes to ourselves.
Unacknowledged ignorance does not lead to good decision-making. Acknowledged ignorance, on the other hand, leads us to seek government ethics advice. Thus, it is not the ignorance that is the problem; it's the myth that we are ethical that leads to a sort of ignorance that justifies our actions and prevents us from seeking independent ethics advice.
The result is saying to ourselves, and even others, such things as "no one will know," "no one will be hurt," "it's not my doing," and "everyone else is doing it, as well." This way, we don't see ourselves as unethical, and believe that others will not, too. But we are wrong on both accounts.
The Myth of Self-Sufficiency
We like to think that we are persons with full autonomy and independent thought, individuals with integrity who make our decisions wholly separate from those around us. We see ourselves as islands, no matter what John Donne wrote four hundred years ago. These things take a long time to sink in.
In fact, we cannot act ethically until we recognize how much our thoughts and actions are affected by our superiors and our colleagues, our friends and our family, and all the fears, needs, and desires we have regarding them. We are social animals, and our ethical decisions are social decisions.
It's not easy to recognize that "we may be victims of forces beyond our control. Nevertheless, holding fast to the myth of self-sufficiency can be deeply ineffective and unproductive; not only do we remain vulnerable to unconscious bias and social cues, but we become complicit in our own vulnerability." Again, we are doubly blind and doubly responsible.
By recognizing that we are social animals affected by our environment, we can seek help from an ethics adviser who is not part of our environment, who lacks the same biases, social cues, and pressures. This is why ethics advice from a government attorney is far less valuable: she has the same biases, the same social cues, and the same pressures as any government official or employee.
The Myth of the Bystander
Studies have shown that we are less likely to act if we are surrounded by individuals who do not act. We tend to look around ourselves seeking confirmation that what we are thinking, how we are interpreting a situation or considering how to respond to it, is right. When no one around us raises an issue or acts in response to a situation, we tend to see ourselves as mere bystanders, as not having any responsibility to raise an issue or act ourselves. When we do this, we tend to downgrade the situation, to make it appear to us less critical.
This myth involves the misreading of social cues. Even when others are thinking, "This is terrible, something has to be done," when these thoughts are left unspoken and no one acts, we think it's not so terrible and it's not up to me to do anything.
This myth undermines individuals' courage to blow whistles. But even more serious, it undermines individuals' inclination to talk about ethical issues. Discussion itself can prevent a lot of ethical misconduct. When there is no discussion, or at least no discussion of the ethical aspects of a situation — as opposed to getting the job done or covering up what occurred — bad things happen.
Fool-ish Advice
The authors conclude that "we face significant temptations to interpret our experience in a way that enables the avoidance or neglect of the responsibility to make consciously-formed ethical judgments." They recognize that, "Courage is needed to resist the temptation to accept one’s personal myths as accurate descriptions of reality, rather than partial and incomplete interpretations that are in need of continual interrogation."
Another problem with personal myths, as opposed to ordinary blind spots, is that because they make sense for us and give us things we need, it is hard to debunk them by showing counter-evidence. It is less a matter of ignorance blocking our view, than of our failure to engage in ethical decision-making, to consider the ethical aspects of a situation.
What can be done? Organizations must emphasize accountability, stop penalizing debate and dissent and, in fact, reward those who ask difficult questions and challenge norms. Otherwise, "the barriers to enacting [ethical] decisions [are] too high."
The authors give two examples of practices to reduce these barriers. They are two versions of an approach I'm crazy about. The first example is the position of corporate "fool" (in the Shakespearean sense), that is, someone whose sole job is to draw attention to what's going wrong. This idea came from Paul Birch, who was appointed corporate fool by British Airways in 1994. His job description was to institutionalize dissent, to make it a normal organizational practice, to discourage groupthink and foment debate.
Think what Congress would be like if there were a fool on the Hill! Think what our cities would be like if mayors, council members, and managers were followed around by a critical jester!
The second example given is the New York Times' public editor.
An ethics officer can fill the same need if the individual holding the position has the understanding and courage to go beyond what individuals believe to be the usual limits of the position. My colleague Carla Miller has done this in Jacksonville, but without wearing motley.
Robert Wechsler
Director of Research-Retired, City Ethics
---
Double Blindness
Their first valuable observation is that, "[i]f left uninterrogated or concealed, ethical blind spots operate as perceptual distortions, encouraging us to believe that we have a full view of our situation when, in fact, our perception ... is partial and incomplete." Thus, "ethical blind spots make us doubly blind; we not only fail to perceive the ethical dimension of problems and situations, but we remain unaware of this failure."
It's as if we walked across intersections without realizing we were colorblind and, therefore, failing to note the position of the lights (my image, not the authors'). Most of the time, we will make it across the street unharmed, but (1) we will cause harm to cars and bicycles that have to slam on their breaks or veer around us, and (2) we will eventually be hurt. Only colorblind individuals who acknowledge that they do not have a complete view of their situation and, therefore, note the position of the lights will not do harm to others or themselves. Otherwise, they are doubly blind, and dangerous.
Personal Myths
The authors focus on three blind spots that they refer to as "personal myths." These are myths not in terms of being lies, but more in terms of classical myths: they provide valuable, but inaccurate explanations. They make sense of very real experiences, even express important truths and provide personal support (e.g., a sense of self-esteem and self-empowerment), but they prevent us from seeing other important truths. The biggest problem is that these mythical explanations lead individuals away from ethical decision-making. In effect, they make us ostriches with our heads in the sand, while at the same time justifying what we do, so that not dealing with ethical matters is not our conscious choice.
This can actually be seen in terms of brain activity. When people are asked to make a choice among possibilities, but are influenced by the decisions of those around them and, therefore, choose the wrong answer, the area of their brain associated with conscious decision-making is inactive, while the area associated with perception is activated. "When we conform to the views of others, evidently we are quite literally ceding our decision-making capacity to others; in effect, we are not deciding at all."
The Myth of Moral Self-Image
The first myth the authors discuss is one that is far too rarely recognized: that we all think we are more ethical than we are. We accomplish this feat by blinding ourselves to evidence to the contrary. This makes us ethically ignorant, at least when it comes to ourselves.
Unacknowledged ignorance does not lead to good decision-making. Acknowledged ignorance, on the other hand, leads us to seek government ethics advice. Thus, it is not the ignorance that is the problem; it's the myth that we are ethical that leads to a sort of ignorance that justifies our actions and prevents us from seeking independent ethics advice.
The result is saying to ourselves, and even others, such things as "no one will know," "no one will be hurt," "it's not my doing," and "everyone else is doing it, as well." This way, we don't see ourselves as unethical, and believe that others will not, too. But we are wrong on both accounts.
The Myth of Self-Sufficiency
We like to think that we are persons with full autonomy and independent thought, individuals with integrity who make our decisions wholly separate from those around us. We see ourselves as islands, no matter what John Donne wrote four hundred years ago. These things take a long time to sink in.
In fact, we cannot act ethically until we recognize how much our thoughts and actions are affected by our superiors and our colleagues, our friends and our family, and all the fears, needs, and desires we have regarding them. We are social animals, and our ethical decisions are social decisions.
It's not easy to recognize that "we may be victims of forces beyond our control. Nevertheless, holding fast to the myth of self-sufficiency can be deeply ineffective and unproductive; not only do we remain vulnerable to unconscious bias and social cues, but we become complicit in our own vulnerability." Again, we are doubly blind and doubly responsible.
By recognizing that we are social animals affected by our environment, we can seek help from an ethics adviser who is not part of our environment, who lacks the same biases, social cues, and pressures. This is why ethics advice from a government attorney is far less valuable: she has the same biases, the same social cues, and the same pressures as any government official or employee.
The Myth of the Bystander
Studies have shown that we are less likely to act if we are surrounded by individuals who do not act. We tend to look around ourselves seeking confirmation that what we are thinking, how we are interpreting a situation or considering how to respond to it, is right. When no one around us raises an issue or acts in response to a situation, we tend to see ourselves as mere bystanders, as not having any responsibility to raise an issue or act ourselves. When we do this, we tend to downgrade the situation, to make it appear to us less critical.
This myth involves the misreading of social cues. Even when others are thinking, "This is terrible, something has to be done," when these thoughts are left unspoken and no one acts, we think it's not so terrible and it's not up to me to do anything.
This myth undermines individuals' courage to blow whistles. But even more serious, it undermines individuals' inclination to talk about ethical issues. Discussion itself can prevent a lot of ethical misconduct. When there is no discussion, or at least no discussion of the ethical aspects of a situation — as opposed to getting the job done or covering up what occurred — bad things happen.
Fool-ish Advice
The authors conclude that "we face significant temptations to interpret our experience in a way that enables the avoidance or neglect of the responsibility to make consciously-formed ethical judgments." They recognize that, "Courage is needed to resist the temptation to accept one’s personal myths as accurate descriptions of reality, rather than partial and incomplete interpretations that are in need of continual interrogation."
Another problem with personal myths, as opposed to ordinary blind spots, is that because they make sense for us and give us things we need, it is hard to debunk them by showing counter-evidence. It is less a matter of ignorance blocking our view, than of our failure to engage in ethical decision-making, to consider the ethical aspects of a situation.
What can be done? Organizations must emphasize accountability, stop penalizing debate and dissent and, in fact, reward those who ask difficult questions and challenge norms. Otherwise, "the barriers to enacting [ethical] decisions [are] too high."
The authors give two examples of practices to reduce these barriers. They are two versions of an approach I'm crazy about. The first example is the position of corporate "fool" (in the Shakespearean sense), that is, someone whose sole job is to draw attention to what's going wrong. This idea came from Paul Birch, who was appointed corporate fool by British Airways in 1994. His job description was to institutionalize dissent, to make it a normal organizational practice, to discourage groupthink and foment debate.
Think what Congress would be like if there were a fool on the Hill! Think what our cities would be like if mayors, council members, and managers were followed around by a critical jester!
The second example given is the New York Times' public editor.
An ethics officer can fill the same need if the individual holding the position has the understanding and courage to go beyond what individuals believe to be the usual limits of the position. My colleague Carla Miller has done this in Jacksonville, but without wearing motley.
Robert Wechsler
Director of Research-Retired, City Ethics
---
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