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Government Ethics Enforcement: An Experiment Worth Trying
Wednesday, January 13th, 2010
Robert Wechsler
Can the government ethics enforcement community learn anything from a
successful experiment in the crime enforcement field? With tongue only
partly in cheek, I will try to show ways in which the government ethics
enforcement community could learn a thing or two.
This week's New York Times Magazine ran an excellent piece by Jeffrey Rosen on a successful approach to crime enforcement. Here's the essence of the article's message:
The article describes David M. Kennedy's Operation Ceasefire in Boston: "he had begun to persuade gangs to behave by issuing a credible threat: namely, that when a gang attracted attention with notorious acts of violence, the entire gang — all of whose members likely had outstanding warrants or probation, parole or traffic violations — would be rounded up."
Visualize this for a moment: instead of an investigation of one or two council members, which might take months, immediately round up the whole council, along with their staff members and, perhaps, the party committee officers.
And not just the police met with the gang members. Community members, their friends and neighbors, came as well, telling them that what they were doing was wrong and that it had to stop.
The meeting involves letting individuals know that the entire group will suffer consequences if one member committed a murder. This happens to be a central fact of government ethics: all politicians suffer when one acts for his or her personal benefit. Whenever something happens, this reminder is important.
The meeting involves offering help from agencies and churches. Such help, in the form of ethics advice and training, should also be offered. It needs to be made very clear that it is not only wrong to act unethically, but it is also wrong to act in gray areas without first seeking advice. If no advice is sought, an official cannot make the excuse that the guidelines are not clear.
The results of these meetings in Boston were striking and immediate. Within two years, youth violence fell by two-thirds and city homicide rates by about half. Sounds like this experiment, in some form or another, is worth a try.
It's important to keep driving through the point that a government's ethics environment is what matters most, that although bad apples exist, they are not the norm. What's the norm is the norms of a community, such things as patronage, loyalty, closed lips, intimidation and fear, feelings of entitlement, and feelings of getting even for the past, when others used their offices for their personal benefit ("it's our turn").
These norms form a government's ethics environment, and treating each instance separately rarely changes the ethics environment that led to the misconduct.
I put off the last part of classical deterrence theory to the end: the need for punishment to be perceived as fair and legitimate. This cannot occur unless the ethics enforcement is done by an independent individual or body. A drug gang isn't going to respect enforcement by people appointed by a rival drug gang. No matter how just the decision, they'll feel it's unfair and will not treat it as legitimate.
Imagine an independent ethics commission or officer, instead of investigating a complaint, immediately calling in a council or board when unethical conduct appears to have occurred, talking with them, reminding them of the harm this causes to them and to the community, offering them advice and insisting that they seek it out. I think that if this is done often and fairly, it could change a government's ethics environment or, at least, the way its officials interact with the ethics commission.
Robert Wechsler
Director of Research-Retired, City Ethics
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This week's New York Times Magazine ran an excellent piece by Jeffrey Rosen on a successful approach to crime enforcement. Here's the essence of the article's message:
-
Classical deterrence theory has long held that the threat of a mild
punishment imposed reliably and immediately has a much greater
deterrent effect than the threat of a severe punishment that is delayed
and uncertain. Recent work in behavioral economics has helped to
explain this phenomenon: people are more sensitive to the immediate
than the slightly deferred future, and focus more on how likely an
outcome is than how bad it is. ... [A]nother reason why the strategy
works: people are most
likely to obey the law when they’re subject to punishments they
perceive as legitimate, fair and consistent, rather than arbitrary and
capricious.
The article describes David M. Kennedy's Operation Ceasefire in Boston: "he had begun to persuade gangs to behave by issuing a credible threat: namely, that when a gang attracted attention with notorious acts of violence, the entire gang — all of whose members likely had outstanding warrants or probation, parole or traffic violations — would be rounded up."
Visualize this for a moment: instead of an investigation of one or two council members, which might take months, immediately round up the whole council, along with their staff members and, perhaps, the party committee officers.
And not just the police met with the gang members. Community members, their friends and neighbors, came as well, telling them that what they were doing was wrong and that it had to stop.
The meeting involves letting individuals know that the entire group will suffer consequences if one member committed a murder. This happens to be a central fact of government ethics: all politicians suffer when one acts for his or her personal benefit. Whenever something happens, this reminder is important.
The meeting involves offering help from agencies and churches. Such help, in the form of ethics advice and training, should also be offered. It needs to be made very clear that it is not only wrong to act unethically, but it is also wrong to act in gray areas without first seeking advice. If no advice is sought, an official cannot make the excuse that the guidelines are not clear.
The results of these meetings in Boston were striking and immediate. Within two years, youth violence fell by two-thirds and city homicide rates by about half. Sounds like this experiment, in some form or another, is worth a try.
It's important to keep driving through the point that a government's ethics environment is what matters most, that although bad apples exist, they are not the norm. What's the norm is the norms of a community, such things as patronage, loyalty, closed lips, intimidation and fear, feelings of entitlement, and feelings of getting even for the past, when others used their offices for their personal benefit ("it's our turn").
These norms form a government's ethics environment, and treating each instance separately rarely changes the ethics environment that led to the misconduct.
I put off the last part of classical deterrence theory to the end: the need for punishment to be perceived as fair and legitimate. This cannot occur unless the ethics enforcement is done by an independent individual or body. A drug gang isn't going to respect enforcement by people appointed by a rival drug gang. No matter how just the decision, they'll feel it's unfair and will not treat it as legitimate.
Imagine an independent ethics commission or officer, instead of investigating a complaint, immediately calling in a council or board when unethical conduct appears to have occurred, talking with them, reminding them of the harm this causes to them and to the community, offering them advice and insisting that they seek it out. I think that if this is done often and fairly, it could change a government's ethics environment or, at least, the way its officials interact with the ethics commission.
Robert Wechsler
Director of Research-Retired, City Ethics
---
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